To create anchor link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=71SlVBgtZG0&t=293s
Working Papers
- Manipulated Date and Motivated Vote: How Changing Election Dates Shapes Turnout
Abstract: Autocracies exploit elections as a tool of political control, but we lack theory and evidence for understanding how manipulated election schedules shape citizens’ political participation. Conventional wisdom suggests that electoral manipulation demobilizes voters. This paper, however, argues that manipulated election dates mobilize voters because this manipulation signals regime weakness. Citizens anticipate the next election will be a tighter contest and therefore become more likely to turn out. I draw evidence from an original online survey experiment in Hong Kong, where the incumbent regime postponed the 2020 legislative election. Experimental evidence that addresses social desirability bias and potential self-censorship demonstrates that election postponement motivates both opposition and government supporters to vote. However, framing election postponement as a signal of government electoral weakness increases the turnout of opposition supporters, while framing the postponement as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic or a regime strategy to deter opposition mobilization increases the turnout of government supporters. Finally, the evidence indicates that election postponement has second order effects that shape voter turnout by boosting citizens’ beliefs that other citizens will be more likely to vote and protest when the election date shifts. The findings suggest that ordinary citizens learn about regime strength from the information revealed by manipulated election schedules, with implications for election turnout and authoritarian stability.
Presented at MPSA 2022, SPSA Summer Meeting 2022, APSA 2022, SPSA 2023, and Virtual Workshop on Authoritarian Regimes (Feb 1, 2023).
Presented at MPSA 2022, SPSA Summer Meeting 2022, APSA 2022, SPSA 2023, and Virtual Workshop on Authoritarian Regimes (Feb 1, 2023).
- Mark Dictators’ Calendars: The Manipulation of Election Schedules in Autocracies
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Abstract: Do elections undermine or stabilize autocratic regimes? This paper distinguishes between negotiated and forced transitions and posits that autocratic elections make dictators and challengers more likely to negotiate a deal for peaceful regime change. Elections reveal information about regime strength, which aligns power contenders’ expectations about conflict outcomes and conduces to their bargaining rather than violent conflict. However, strong ruling parties weaken this informational effect of elections because the party shapes all players’ expectations about incumbent strength, leaving less room for elections to yield information. Using two-way fixed effects and instrumental variable models, this paper examines regime transitions in 261 autocracies from 1955 to 2010 with a long regime-month panel data. It introduces a new global Dataset of Autocratic Election Schedules (DAES) and a novel measure of autocratic party strength. Findings suggest that negotiated transitions are more likely to occur in autocracies with recent national elections than in those without, but this negotiation effect only holds for regimes with either no support party or a weak one. This paper demonstrates the distinct logics of negotiated and forced transitions with implications for understanding how and when elections can produce peaceful regime change.
Presented at APSA 2019, PEDD 2020, MWEPS V in 2020, and SPSA 2021. |
Marginal Effects of Elections on Negotiated Transitions
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- I Leave in Peace: Autocratic Elections and Negotiated Regime Transitions
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Abstract: Do elections undermine or stabilize autocratic regimes? This paper distinguishes between negotiated and forced transitions and posits that autocratic elections make dictators and challengers more likely to negotiate a deal for peaceful regime change. Elections reveal information about regime strength, which aligns power contenders’ expectations about conflict outcomes and conduces to their bargaining rather than violent conflict. However, strong ruling parties weaken this informational effect of elections because the party shapes all players’ expectations about incumbent strength, leaving less room for elections to yield information. Using two-way fixed effects and instrumental variable models, this paper examines regime transitions in 261 autocracies from 1955 to 2010 with a long regime-month panel data. It introduces a new global Dataset of Autocratic Election Schedules (DAES) and a novel measure of autocratic party strength. Findings suggest that negotiated transitions are more likely to occur in autocracies with recent national elections than in those without, but this negotiation effect only holds for regimes with either no support party or a weak one. This paper demonstrates the distinct logics of negotiated and forced transitions with implications for understanding how and when elections can produce peaceful regime change.
Presented at APSA 2019, PEDD 2020, MWEPS V in 2020, and SPSA 2021. |
Marginal Effects of Elections on Negotiated Transitions
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Working Papers
- Publish More as Corruption Perishes: Scientific Research and Anticorruption Campaigns (with Zhongyang He) (abstract and manuscript)
- International Mudslinging in Vain: An Experiment on COVID-Related Propaganda and Overseas Nationals’ Support for Autocratic Government (with Rosemary Pang) (abstract and manuscript)
mark dictaors
mark dictaors
mark dictaors
mark dictaors
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