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Abstract: Autocrat elections are at the mercy of the dictator. While scholars have long debated the political consequences of autocratic elections, we lack a clear understanding of the timing of autocratic elections. Indeed, even among “electoral autocracies” some dictators hold elections as scheduled, while others manipulate the election date or cancel scheduled elections altogether. This paper argues that the dictator’s scheduling decisions hinge on the leader’s expected strength. Building on game-theoretic logic, I demonstrate that weak dictators – those that lack either a strong party to mobilize electoral support or a strong military to repress opposition mobilization – are more likely than strong ones to manipulate election schedules: weak leaders alter election schedules either to prevent exposure of their weakness or to buy time for mobilizing electoral support. This paper tests these expectations with over six decades of original data on autocratic election schedules – election announcements, postponements, cancellations, and realizations. I find that weak dictators are the most likely to manipulate election schedules. The findings imply that dictators interrupt elections when they have little confidence to defeat electoral or armed challenges.
Presented at MPSA 2021, APSA 2021, SPSA 2022, PEDD 2022, Political Science Speaker Series for Chinese Scholars (Feb 25, 2022), ISA Virtual 2023, and ISA 2024. |
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