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Abstract: Autocratic elections are at the mercy of the dictator. While scholars have long debated the political consequences of autocratic elections, we lack a clear understanding of the timing of autocratic elections. Some dictators hold elections as scheduled, while others manipulate the election date or cancel scheduled elections altogether. This paper argues that the dictator's scheduling decisions hinge on the leader's expected strength. Building on game-theoretic logic, I demonstrate that weak dictators–those that lack either a strong party to mobilize electoral support or a strong military to repress opposition mobilization–are more likely than strong ones to manipulate election schedules, in the hope of avoiding the exposure of their weakness. This paper tests these expectations with over six decades of original data on autocratic election schedules–election announcements, postponements, cancellations, and occurrences. I find that weak dictators are the most likely to manipulate election schedules. The findings imply that dictators interrupt elections when they have little confidence to defeat electoral or armed challenges.
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Marginal Effects on Schedule Interruption
Marginal Effects on Schedule Interruption: Nominal Strength Indices
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