Research
Dissertation: Mark Dictators’ Calendars: An Informational Theory of Election Schedules in Autocracies
This dissertation focuses on election schedules in autocratic regimes: Why do some dictators call elections at a convenient time while others observe prescribed schedules? What is the impact of manipulated election schedules on regime stability and the political participation of ordinary citizens? Elections are informative in that they reveal regime strength to power contenders; when dictators manipulate election schedules, it sends a public signal of weakness that they are concerned about either their performance in a nearing election or their declining popularity in a future one. Therefore, this dissertation argues that dictators’ scheduling decisions hinge on their self-estimated strength.
With a formal model, cross-national analysis using an original dataset, and a survey experiment, I present evidence that: 1) Dictators who deem themselves very weak or very strong manipulate election schedules; 2) On-time elections increase the likelihood of peaceful, negotiated transitions, especially where the ruling party is weak; and 3) Manipulated election schedules make ordinary citizens more willing to turn out to vote and join protests.
With a formal model, cross-national analysis using an original dataset, and a survey experiment, I present evidence that: 1) Dictators who deem themselves very weak or very strong manipulate election schedules; 2) On-time elections increase the likelihood of peaceful, negotiated transitions, especially where the ruling party is weak; and 3) Manipulated election schedules make ordinary citizens more willing to turn out to vote and join protests.